Look out for this

Krist Vaesen & Martin Peterson of the Eindhoven University of Technology have posted to the PHILOS-L email list a summary of findings resulting from an online survey of philosophers.

These were as follows:

• A statistically significant portion of trained philosophers intuit that one can know that p, without this being an instance of knowledge, in particular when p, although justified and true, has no (or limited)informational content
• The epistemic intuitions of trained philosophers depend significantly on their mother tongue
• These effects apply even if only philosophers with a doctoral degree are considered.

A paper is planned and will arrive at http://home.ieis.tue.nl/kvaesen/ when completed.

I am particularly interested to read about the last two claims!

X-phi survey on Normative Judgements

Please philosophers (only) follow the link through to Stephen Stich’s latest survey on normative judgements … Survey!

I remember having some sort of input to the structure of what I can only imagine was this particular survey in progress, although can’t remember exactly what.  I certainly remember some of the examples, which are unforgettable; it is worth taking part if only to experience them.

Dissertation Material 2: Pedagogical/Illustrative Thought-Experiments

[The following is a heavily edited version of a section from my MA dissertation.  It is not meant therefore to stand alone in terms of motivation or argument, but presents some interesting ideas nonetheless.  The background is that there is a potential problem raised by the persuasive power yet eminent fallibility of thought-experiments.  This section notes that this problem does not exist for one particular way of persuading through thought-experiments]

Thought-experiments are often used merely to illustrate, or to teach the inner workings of, a theory.  They provide a route into understanding otherwise opaque theory (Klassen, 2006); accordingly their place in education—science especially—has been emphasised by many.

One may not understand Utilitarianism expressed thus: to do right is to maximise pleasure and minimise pain.  A teacher may provide one with a better grasp using a thought-experiment.

Imagine it is Right to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. An old blind woman is about to step out in front of a lorry. Should you stop and help, if

Condition A: You are on your way to the shops?

Condition B: You are a fire-fighter on your way to put out a blaze in an old people’s home?

The reaction, ‘Oh I see, that’s the sort of decision I would have to make,’ allows one to better understand Utilitarianism, and in turn be more likely to be persuaded as to its merits (or indeed persuaded as to its falsity).^[1]

Teachers often use thought-experiments in this manner. Whilst they may not wish to persuade students as to the truth of some theory, it is often in their interest to portray the theory in a favourable light.  Teachers wish to encourage students to recognise that a theory is worthy of consideration, to make salient its merits.  The fact that this use of thought-experiment may aid persuasive efforts does not seem to generate a problem.

It is nonetheless noteworthy that a pedagogical or illustrative use of a thought-experiment is not necessarily an impartial presentation. Without the evenness of hand expected a teacher may raise the probability that she, to whom the illustration is addressed, will be persuaded in any one direction. Rather, an illustrative/pedagogical use of a thought-experiment is characterised by being foremost a mere demonstration of the features of theory—regardless of any bias in the presentation.  This use exists also in science. One might have difficulty understanding relativity of simultaneity, until one considers the following imaginary example.  This is based on an example in (Magueijo, 2003)

Einstein has a dream: a long line of cows is electrocuted by current passing along a single straight wire. One observer notes each cow jump back in sequence, as the current flows away from him. Another, stood at the other end of the wire, observes each cow jump back simultaneously. (The speed of light is assumed to be equal to that of the current in the wire).

The thought-experiment demonstrates that the theory has some explanatory power; that it is worthy of consideration and acceptance. It is not used to establish the conclusion per se. Rather, it is an exposition, which may contribute to some party’s persuasion.

To conclude, thought-experiments may aid in persuasion whilst used in purely pedagogical or illustrative manners.  However, beyond worries about partial presentation in situations in which impartiality is presumed, there is little motivation for worrying about thought-experiments as a methodological resource when used in this manner.  We have the resources to analyse whether something has gone wrong in the portrayal of a theory and should be able to avoid any problems.

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[1] For, better understanding of a theory may motivate its rejection. However, given one cannot accept a theory which one doesn’t think one understands, I maintain that (in a trivial sense) understanding a theory will raise the probability one will accept it. None-the-less, the motivation of rejection is still persuasion, albeit not in the direction that the persuader desired.

An Interesting Use of Intuitions

Philosophers sometimes worry:  Which things in the world are objects?  Nikk Effingham proposed the following answer:  (roughly) objects are those things which are causally efficacious. His presentation attempted to provide motivation for accepting his answer, it is a peculiar aspect of this attempt to motivate upon which I comment. 

He listed the following six motivations, which were broadly (my frequent use of the word intuition does not quite mirror Nikk’s talk, but I think is legitimate):

1. Intuitively there’s some link between composition and causation (which his answer satisfies)
2. There’s something intuitive about notions such as ‘all things are casually efficacious’ ‘all concrete/material  things …’ (which his answer satisfies)
3. Nikk’s answer satisfies our everyday intuitions about what things should count as objects.
4. Nikk’s answer satisfies our everyday intuitions about what things shouldn’t count as objects
5. Nikk’s answer is simple, a quality which counts contributes to the intuitiveness of the answer and thus the likelihood that it is a good one.

Nikk is merely providing us with reasons why one might want to accept the theory.  This strategy by itself is so far largely unproblematic.  Pursuing such a strategy, it seems, one must only appeal to the intuitions of [she in whom one wishes to motivate the proposed solution]—variously: an audience member, reader, metaphysician etc.

The addition of the sixth motivation, however, seems rather strange.

6.  “Possible and Actual Cultures vary over what things compose.  An answer should try and ensure it isn’t privileging cultural prejudices for no good reason. … [Nikk’s answer] meets this condition” 

That is: intuitions about what counts as an object vary cross-culturally and we should not advocate a theory which matches one culture’s intuition’s over an others. 

Tying composition to causal efficacy provides a cultural bias independent  answer to the question.  6. heralds this as a motivation for accepting Nikk’s answer.  However, the first five motivations urge the audience member (for instance) to be in favour of Nikk’s solution in virtue of the fact that it is satisfies a number of their intuitions.

Such a criticism so far carries little weight.  There might be good reason to think that the intuitions appealed to in the first five motivations do not vary cross-culturally—although it does seem odd not to mention these reasons.  It might simply be that there is no variation regarding these intuitions, and for some reason it is okay not to have shown this fact empirically.

However, it seems that 6 tells us that variation exists; variation in intuitions such as used in the first five motivations.

Nikk tells us Actual Cultures vary over what things compose.  It follows that the intuitive placing of things in ‘object’ and ‘non-object’ boxes of one culture, is sometimes not the same as that of others.  That is: the intuitions alluded to in 3. and 4. vary.

(Nikk’s answer to this was something like:  (with regard motivations 3. and 4.) we might sometimes have reason to think that our initial intuitions don’t tell a true story.  Such a reason might come in the form of finding out that a putative object was not in fact causally efficacious.  There is something a mite circular created here, but that might be unproblematic due to the fact that we are but motivating.)

I was simply amused by this quirky strategy that motivates a theory with nothing but a particular group’s intuitions, except by also claiming the theory to be insensitive to extant cultural bias in intuition.   It is unfortunate that the extant variation is connected to the intuitions used in the motivation and creates a tension.  However, as I say this may not be a big problem.

 

Terence Keeley, Sex and Students

Terence Kealey was commissioned by THE to write a humorous piece on Lust within the University environment.  In the same ‘seven deadly sins of the academy’ appeared a piece by Simon Blackburn on Complacency.  Kealey took the issue of academic staff and students getting into bed with each other as his focus.  There has been recently some debate as to the appropriateness of this piece. 

I am not in a position to outright question the man’s integrity or to call for his resignation—as many are doing—yet can with no hesitate declare, the man lacks wisdom.  Tongue-in-cheek declarations of outrageously inappropriate/abusive/sexist a manner might well be a legitimate tool for helping to combat those who profess them earnestly.  However, if Kealey was wholeheartedly doing this, he should have done a much better job of making it obvious that this was his goal.

The original piece from 17th Sept is here, I have copied snippets from the text below:

“The myth is that an affair between a student and her academic lover represents an abuse of his power. What power? … the days are gone when a scholar could trade sex for upgrades. I know of two girls who, in 1982, got firsts in biochemistry from a south-coast university in exchange for favours to a professor, but I know of no later scandals…

Normal girls - more interested in abs than in labs, more interested in pecs than specs, more interested in triceps than tripos - will abjure their lecturers for the company of their peers, but nonetheless, most male lecturers know that, most years, there will be a girl in class who flashes her admiration and who asks for advice on her essays. What to do?

Enjoy her! She's a perk. … she will flaunt you her curves. Which you should admire daily to spice up your sex, nightly, with the wife.

Yup, I'm afraid so. As in Stringfellows, you should look but not touch. …

So, sow your oats while you are young but enjoy the views - and only the views - when you are older.”

There was an article published by the BBC describing the public reaction today, the original is here, snippets below.  The original BBC article was (I think) published after Kealey’s reaction to online criticism but I give it here since it gives a flavour of the online response:

“The National Union of Students condemned the comments as insulting and disrespectful to women.”

“Olivia Bailey, womens' officer for the NUS, said: I am appalled that a university vice-chancellor should display such an astounding lack of respect for women.”

"Regardless of whether this was an attempt at humour, it is completely unacceptable for someone in Terence Kealey's position to compare a lecture theatre to a lap dancing club, and I expect that many women studying at Buckingham University will be feeling extremely angry and insulted at these comments."

“Dr Kealey said he was using humour to warn against lust”

"I'm amazed that Terence K has a position in any university, and I'll be damn sure never to apply for a job at Buckingham, said one reader.”

“Another added: Any scholar, who assumes that female students who show interest in the subject and ask for help because they have a crush on you or hope to manipulate you with their sexual charms, is a reality-challenged idiot.”

"And anyone who thinks that female students are there in the classroom expressly as objects of the instructor's viewing pleasure needs to retire."

“But another said: I'm appalled that everyone's so appalled! - it's just not that important, or offensive."

“A spokesman for the University and College Union said: "Harassment is not something to be taken lightly and I would be surprised, and deeply concerned, if any university, or vice-chancellor, tried to laugh it off."

Finally Kealey’s response in full original here:

This is a moral piece that says that middle aged male academics and young female undergraduates should not sleep together. Rather, people should exercise self-restraint. Because transgressional sex is inappropriate, the piece uses inappropriate and transgressional language to underscore the point - a conventional literary device. At a couple of places, the piece confounds expectations, another conventional literary device, designed to maintain the reader's interest. Sex between academics and students is not funny, and should not be a source of humour. But employing humour to highlight the ways by which people try to resolve the dissonance between what is publicly expected of them and how they actually feel - not just in this context - reaches back to origins of humour itself. In his introduction, Matthew wondered how many of his contributors would enter into the spirit of levity that inspired the idea of the seven deadly academic sins (submitting a piece on prevarication late, etc) and I suspected that one could get to heart of all that is wrong with sex between scholars and students by employing the good ol' boy language of middle aged male collusion. I'm not sure I'm wrong.